A good place to begin learning about counterinsurgency warfare
This US Army / Marine Corps manual reads far more like a book than a dry piece of doctrine. This recent manual draws heavily on US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as lessons from US and British experience in the Philippines, Malaya, El Salvador and Vietnam. I have read several other COIN manuals and papers before (Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and Resisting Rebelion) and this manual contains a good summary of these books and other papers. It would be a good place for anyone looking to study insurgencies and counterinsurgencies to begin their study.

The book begins by cover basic aspects of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The book then goes in to integrating military and civilian agencies, the role of intelligence, designing and executing campaigns and training host nation forces.

One area that the book does not focus on is in depth case studies. Numerous examples are cited to illustrate points, but to really look at a conflict one will need to go to one of the numerous books listed in reading lists provided at the end.

for soldiers or graduate students?
I've long nutured a private grievance against FM 3-24, which suddenly broke surface when I read this delicious comment by Steve Cole in The New Yorker this week: "Its reception reflected ... the appeal of counter-insurgency among sections of the country's liberal-minded intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students--complex, blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never own a gun."

A more scholarly analysis of FM 3-24's failings, by Andrew Salamone, appears in the August edition of the online Small Wars Journal. He thinks that the historical examples in the manual are too selective, and warns: "While the current application of the new doctrine appears to be showing signs of success in Iraq, at least in terms of metrics measuring levels of violence and U.S. casualties, our enemy's well documented strategic, operational, and tactical adaptability all but guarantees that current doctrine will be out of date for the next conflict and result in the well known axiom of trying to 'fight the last war again'."

Insightful and comprehensive
The Counterinsurgency Field Manual is a surprisingly well considered text on the nature of insurgency and the points where the course of an insurgency can be influenced.

Something is (or should be) rather confusing about the U.S. military. Since the inception of the Continental Army in the American Revolution, the U.S. military has been involved with counterinsurgency operations almost constantly, at home and abroad. (Put this way, Americans were waging counterinsurgency since before there was a United States; the French and Indian War...) What is confusing is 'why isn't the U.S. better at it?'

Setting this underlying question to one side, this text sets forth a framework for understanding the causes of insurgencies, and for dealing with them. The full scope of cultural, economic, social, political, and other factors are addressed in considerable detail, along with approaches to influencing these factors to address the root causes of insurgency. It is a robust, comprehensive work that can provide an adaptable conceptual structure for anyone involved in counterinsurgency or issues relating to counterinsurgency.

The big question in my mind; Why did the Army have to manage developing this process, when more than half the work required to respond to an insurgency should be done or overseen by the State Department? Why do soldiers have to arrange economic reconstruction and infrastructure development? Aren't those folks at the State Department competent to do all this stuff?

E.M. Van Court

Excellent & See Social Networking Analysis (SNA) Appendix
I believe this manual is an excellent overview of counterinsurgency strategy and some tactics. This includes the broad strategy as well as to the drill down for the units/teams/boots on the ground. Its stated audience is for battalion commanders and their staff and higher. I would recommend it to any soldier, sailor or marine regardless of rank and for U.S. citizens generally who have an interest in the topic.

According to the manual, the host nation (HN) and the counterinsurgency force (COIN) will win if they can provide security first, and then other functions of a responsive - responsive to the HN populace - HN government. Otherwise, the populace will seek security and services elsewhere (i.e., in insurgent organizations/militias). This is not necessarily a sequential ordering. While basic security is fundamental - once a baseline is reached - other governmental functions responsive to HN's populace's concerns should also be instituted, supported, and reinforced, while still improving and accelerating the improvement of the security environment for the populace. One example used is how insurgency organizations/militias can destabilize the security environment and create insecurity through terrorist strikes, in order to then be viewed by the populace as the cure to the insecurity by operating militias to defend against such insecurity, and thus try to gain popular support.

Bottom line: creation, maintenance and sustainment (or assisting/building up) of legitimacy in the host nation vs. the insurgent organizations is the contest and crux of the matter. Insurgency and counterinsurgency is a fight for the support of the populace (i.e., the big middle). This conclusion should have been clear by now - insurgency has been with us for a very long time. For some examples, in the West, you can go back to at least to Julius Caesar for lessons; see also Napoleon; in the East, you can go back to at least to Sun-Tzu's The Art of War.

According to the manual, to win an insurgency/counterinsurgency type conflict, requires staying power without intentional or unintentional signaling of wavering support for staying the distance, at least until the HN has achieved the "tipping point" in terms of legitimacy and popular support.

As an aside, there is a good appendix on Social Network Analysis (SNA), which provides a cogent overview of some of the key concepts for those not familiar with SNA or its use in war, conflict, or intelligence.

Required reading for foreign staff and U.S. leaders
This manual should be required reading for any candidate for public office at a national level, as well as all foreign staff personnel. After reading the manual I was better able to understand the motivations and actions of the various factions within Iran today. It also re-enforces the idea that terrorism / insurgency is not just an issue for a single nation, but anymore is a global issue.